NAMA KELOMPOK :
1.
AUDIA ELFIKA WARDHANI (21212240)
2.
BARON ADHITAMA (28212097)
KELAS : 4EB13
Jurnal 1 : PENGARUH PAJAK, TUNNELING INCENTIVE DAN GOOD
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (GCG) TERHADAP INDIKASI MELAKUKAN TRANSFER PRICING PADA PERUSAHAAN MANUFAKTUR YANG TERDAFTAR DI BURSA
EFEK INDONESIA (STUDI PADA BURSA EFEK INDONESIA YANG BERKAITAN DENGAN
PERUSAHAAN ASING).
Latar
Belakang
Transfer
pricing merupakan isu yang
sensitif dalam dunia bisnis maupun ekonomi secara global, terutama dalam
perpajakan. Aktivitas dari transfer pricing dilakukan oleh perusahaan
multinasional akan mempengaruhi tingkat penerimaan negara dari sisi pajak baik
secara langsung maupun tidak langsung. Transfer pricing dilakukan dengan
menentukan jumlah penghasilan yang didapat masing-masing perusahaan yang
terlibat dan penerimaan pajak penghasilan di negara pengekspor maupun negara
pengimpor.
Praktik
transfer pricing telah dilakukan di beberapa perusahaan multinasional di
Inggris, contohnya Starbuck pada tahun 2011 tidak membayar pajak sama sekali
dan mengaku rugi sejak tahun 2008, padahal telah berhasil mencetak penjualan
sebesar £112 juta atau sekitar Rp 1,7 triliun. Selama beroperasi di Inggris,
Starbucks hanya menyetorkan pajak sebesar £6 juta. Sebagian besar keuntungan
Starbuck telah dialihkan dari Inggris ke perusahaan cabang di Belanda dalam
bentuk royalti (Barford, 2013).
Ada
beberapa alasan atau faktor perusahaan multinasional melakukan transfer
pricing. Salah satunya adalah alasan pajak. Menurut Suryana dalam Yuniasih et
al., (2012:13), tujuan dilakukan transfer pricing adalah untuk
mengakali jumlah laba perusahaan sehingga pajak yang dibayar dan dividen yang
dibagikan menjadi rendah. Hal ini membuktikan bahwa motivasi pajak memiliki
peran yang tinggi dalam mempengaruhi keputusan melakukan transfer pricing.
Faktor
lain yang memungkinkan perusahaan dalam mengambil keputusan melakukan transfer
pricing adalah tunneling. Tunneling adalah pemindahan sumber
daya dari dalam perusahaan ke pemegang saham pengendali (Johnson, 2000:22).
Pemindahan sumber daya dapat dilakukan dengan berbagai cara, salah satunya
adalah dengan melalui transfer pricing. Lo et al., (2010:5)
menyatakan bahwa kosentrasi kepemilikan oleh pemerintah di Tiongkok berpengaruh
terhadap keputusan transfer pricing dimana perusahaan bersedia
mengorbankan penghematan pajak untuk tunneling keuntungan ke perusahaan
induk.
Faktor
lain yang mampu mempengaruhi perusahaan melakukan transfer pricing adalah
tata kelola perusahaan (corporate governance). Good corporate
governance menjalankan dan mengembangkan perusahaan dengan bersih, patuh
pada hukum yang berlaku dan peduli terhadap lingkungan yang dilandasi
nilai-nilai sosial budidaya yang tinggi. Unsur-unsur dari good corporate
governance di antaranya; pemegang saham, direksi, dewan komisaris, manajer,
karyawan, komite audit, investor, akuntan publik, kualitas audit dan lain
sebagainya (Sutedi, 2012:12).
Berdasarkan
penjabaran tersebut maka penelitian ini akan menguji kembali pengaruh pajak, tunneling
incentive dan good corporate governance dengan variabel kualitas
audit terhadap transfer pricing pada perusahaan manufaktur. Pemilihan
perusahaan manufaktur karena perusahaan ini memiliki potensi tinggi dalam
melakukan transfer pricing selain itu Penanaman Modal Asing (PMA)
dilakukan pada perusahaan yang bergerak di bidang manufaktur dan mempunyai
kaitan intern perusahaan yang cukup substansial dengan induk perusahaan di luar
negeri (Gunadi dalam Pramana, 2014:7). Judul dari penelitian ini adalah
“Pengaruh Pajak, Tunneling Incentive dan Good Corporate Governance (GCG)
Terhadap Indikasi Melakukan Transfer Pricing pada Perusahaan Manufaktur
di Bursa Efek Indonesia”.
Tujuan
:
Penelitian
ini bertujuan untuk meneliti pengaruh pajak, tunneling incentive dan good
corporate governance (GCG) terhadap indikasi melakukan transfer pricing pada
perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia.
Hipotesis:
H1: Pajak berpengaruh signifikan
terhadap indikasi melakukan transfer pricing.
H2: Tunneling incentive berpengaruh
signifikan terhadap indikasi melakukan transfer pricing.
H3: Good corporate governance berpengaruh
signifikan terhadap indikasi melakukan transfer pricing.
Alat
Analisis :
1.
Kelayakan Model Regresi
2.
Keseluruhan Model (Overall Model Fit Test)
3.
Koefisien Determinasi R2 (Nagelkerke’s R Square)
4.
Uji Hipotesis (Variables in Equation)
Objek
Penelitian :
Sampel
penelitian yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah perusahaan manufaktur
yang terdaftar di BEI periode 2012-2014 yang berjumlah 40 perusahaan dengan
metode purposive sampling.
Pembahasan :
1.
Pengaruh
Pajak terhadap Indikasi Melakukan Transfer Pricing
Berdasarkan
uji hipotesis yang telah dilakukan,variabel pajak berpengaruh signifikan
terhadap indikasi melakukan transfer pricing pada perusahaan manufaktur
yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa motivasi
pajak menjadi salah satu alasan perusahaan manufaktur melakukan transfer
pricing dengan cara melakukan transaksi kepada perusahaan afiliasi yang ada
di luar batas negara. Perusahaan melakukan transfer pricing dalam
perencanaan pajaknya guna meminimalkan pajak yang dibayar.
2.
Pengaruh Tunneling Incentive terhadap
Indikasi Melakukan Transfer Pricing
Berdasarkan uji
hipotesis yang telah dilakukan, variabel tunneling incentive berpengaruh
signifikan terhadap indikasi melakukan transfer pricing pada perusahan
manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa
perusahaan yang memiliki kepemilikan terkosentrasi pada satu pihak atau satu
kepentingan cenderung akan melakukan tunneling di dalamnya dengan cara
melalui transaksi transfer pricing. Transaksi transfer pricing itu
dilakukan dengan melalui penjualan antar perusahaan seafiliasi.
3.
Pengaruh
Good Corporate Governance terhadap Indikasi Melakukan Transfer Pricing
Berdasarkan uji
hipotesis yang telah dilakukan, good corporate governance berpengaruh
tidak signifikan terhadap indikasi melakukan transfer pricing pada
perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Hal ini menunjukkan
bahwa tata kelola perusahaan tidak mempengaruhi perusahaan tersebut untuk
melakukan transfer pricing atau tidak. Perusahaan tidak mempertimbangkan
pengelolaan perusahaan yang baik sebagai dasar untuk aktivitas transfer
pricing.
Kesimpulan
:
Berdasarkan hasil penelitian maka
dapat ditarik kesimpulan sebagai berikut:
1. Transfer pricing merupakan harga yang dibebankan
pada transaksi penjualan barang maupun jasa yang ditanggung oleh pihak pembeli
dalam hubungan istimewa antar divisi maupun perusahaan.
2. Variabel pajak menunjukkan
pengaruh positif signifikan terhadap indikasi melakukan transaksi transfer
pricing, dimana transaksi transfer pricing yang dilakukan dengan
perusahaan afiliasi berada di luar batas negara digunakan sebagai salah satu
cara perencanaan pajak. Perusahaan mengalihkan kekakayaan ke perusahaan lain
yang berada di luar Indonesia demgan cara transfer pricing, sehingga
laba berkurang dan pajak yang dibayarkan juga berkurang.
3.
Variabel
tunneling incentive menunjukkan pengaruh positif dan signifikan terhadap
indikasi melakukan transaksi transfer pricing, dimana perusahaan sampel
dengan kepemilikan terkosentrasi pada sebagian kecil pihak cenderung melakukan tunneling
melalui transfer pricing di dalamnya. Tujuannya untuk meningkatkan
laba bagi pemegang saham mayoritas yang menyebabkan kerugian bagi pemegang
saham minoritas.
4.
Variabel
good corporate governance menunjukkan pengaruh positif dan tidak
signifikan terhadap indikasi melakukan transfer pricing, dimana
perusahaan tidak mempertimbangkan tata kelola perusahaan yang baik sebagai
dasar penentuan kegiatan transfer pricing.
Jurnal 2 : ANALISIS PENENTUAN HARGA
TRANSFER TERHADAP KONTRIBUSI LABA ANTAR DIVISI PADA MEUBEL UD. ARIF.
Latar Belakang :
Di era sekarang ini
semakin banyak peluang pasar yang timbul karena semakin banyaknya jenis
kebutuhan manusia. Dimana mendorong perusahaan untuk lebih berkembang lagi
untuk memenuhi kebutuhan manusia yang beragam. Semakin berkembangnya
perusahaan, semakin kompleks lingkungan
bisnis yang dihadapinya. Dengan semakin kompleksnya lingkungan industri,
manajemen menghadapi banyak ketidakpastian sehingga resiko bisnis menjadi
meningkat. Bersamaan dengan itu aktivitas operasi perusahaan semakin beraneka
ragam, maksudnya adalah suatu kegiatan produksi yang berkesinambungan mulai
dari bahan mentah sampai barang jadi.
Manajemen umumnya berusaha mengurangi resiko bisnis
yang dihadapinya dengan cara membagi kegiatannya menjadi divisi-divisi. Dengan
semakin banyaknya divisi masalah yang timbul akan semakin kompleks. Mengingat
waktu maupun keahlian manajer puncak yang terbatas, maka divisionalisasi ini
diikuti dengan adanya desentralisasi, yaitu pendelegasian wewenang manajer
puncak kepada manajer divisi.
Tiap-tiap divisi yang merupakan pusat pertanggung jawaban
menghasilkan produk sejenis atau berlainan dan ada kalanya saling berkaitan.
Masing-masing divisi tersebut melaksanakan kegiatan produksi tertentu saja dan
bukan keseluruhan yang berdiri sendiri. Oleh karena masing-masing divisi adalah
unit yang berdiri sendiri, maka atas produk atau jasa yang ditransfer dilakukan
pembebanan biaya.
Dalam pemindahan atau transfer produk dari divisi
satu ke divisi lain diperlukan suatu kebijakan perusahaan mengenai besarnya
harga transfer yang harus dibebankan oleh divisi pembuat atas produk yang
dihasilkannya. Berdasarkan uraian di atas, peneliti tertarik untuk mengambil
judul yaitu: “Analisis Penentuan Harga Transfer Terhadap Kontribusi Laba
Antar Devisi Pada Meubel UD. Arif”.
Tujuan :
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui penentuan
harga transfer terhadap kontribusi laba antar devisi pada Meubel UD. Arif.
Alat Analisis :
1. Metode
harga transfer berdasarkan biaya penuh
2. Metode
harga transfer berdasarkan biaya variabel
3. Metode
harga transfer berdasarkan biaya ditambah laba
4. Metode
harga transfer berdasarkan harga pasar
Objek Penelitian :
Penelitian ini dilakukan di Meubel UD. Arif. Adapun
yang menjadi populasi dalam penelitian ini adalah harga transfer dan kontribusi
laba yang diperoleh tiap-tiap divisi tahun 2005 – 2014 yang ada di Meubel UD.
Arif. Sedangkan sampel dalam penelitian ini adalah harga transfer dan
kontribusi laba selama 1 tahun terakhir yaitu pada tahun 2014.
Pembahasan dan
Kesimpulan :
Untuk mengetahui bagaimana tingkat daya saing harga
transfer produk apabila harga transfer dihitung dengan menggunakan keempat
metode yaitu: metode harga transfer berdasarkan biaya penuh, metode harga
transfer berdasarkan biaya variable, metode harga transfer berdasarkan biaya
penuh ditambah laba, metode harga transfer berdasarkan harga pasar. Sehingga
nantinya dapat diterapkan sebagai penetapan harga transfer yang layak bagi
devisi-devisi dalam perusahaan. Analisis data pada penelitian ini yaitu dengan
membandingkan besarnya kontribusi laba yang diperoleh dari metode harga
transfer yang digunakan oleh perusahaan dengan teori yang ada.
Pada umumnya penentuan harga transfer merupakan
suatu kebijakan yang sangat menentukan tiap-tiap devisi untuk memperoleh laba
secara optimal. Oleh sebab itu peneliti disini ingin mengetahui apakah
kebijakan penentuan harga transfer yang ditetapkan perusahaan memang sudah adil
untuk kedua unit/devisi. Setelah melakukan perhitungan dari beberapa metode
penentuan harga transfer diperoleh data sebagai berikut:
Perbandingan
Besarnya Harga Transfer Devisi Kayu
|
Metode Harga Transfer
|
Jumlah
|
|
Biaya
Penuh (full costing)
|
Rp
1.848.436/kubik
|
|
Biaya
Variabel (vairable costing)
|
Rp
1.702.404/kubik
|
|
Biaya
Penuh + Laba
|
Rp
1.940.858/kubik
|
|
Harga
Pasar
|
Rp
2.476.957/kubik
|
Sumber
: Meubel UD. Arif dan Data Olahan
Untuk mengetahui perbedaan besarnya kontribusi
produk yang ditransfer antara ketentuan perusahaan dengan alternatif yang
diusulkan, maka perlu diketahui margin kotribusinya yang merupakan selisih antara
pendapatan dengan biaya variabel. Dari perhitungan beberapa metode,
perbandingan kontribusi laba pada kedua devisi adalah sebagai berikut:
Perbandingan
Kontribusi Laba
|
Metode Harga Transfer
|
Jumlah
|
|
|
Devisi
Kayu
|
Devisi
Mebel
|
|
|
Biaya
Penuh (full costing)
|
Rp
101.382.780
|
Rp
127.092.720
|
|
Biaya
Variabel (variabel costing)
|
Rp
67.795.420
|
Rp
160.680.080
|
|
Biaya
Penuh + Laba
|
Rp
143.896.900
|
Rp
84.578.600
|
|
Harga
Pasar
|
Rp
245.942.610
|
(Rp
17.467.110)
|
Sumber
: Meubel UD. Arif dan Data Olahan
Berdasarkan perhitungan yang sudah dilakukan,
diketahui bahwa penentuan harga transfer yang telah ditetapkan perusahaan
merupakan keputusan yang tepat. Karena mencerminkan kontribusi laba yang adil
bagi tiap devisi, dengan menggunakan metode biaya penuh biaya yang dikeluarkan
devisi pembeli tidak terlalu tinggi namun juga tidak merugikan devisi penjual
karena disamping menjual kepada intern, juga menjual kepada pihak ekstern yang
dapat menghasilkan laba lebih tinggi. Sehingga dalam proses produksi kedua
devisi bisa saling membantu untuk mendapatkan laba yang adil.
Jurnal 3 :
PENGARUH BEBAN PAJAK, TUNNELING INCENTIVE,
DAN KARAKTER EKSEKUTIF TERHADAP KEPUTUSAN TRANSFER
PRICING PERUSAHAAN (STUDI EMPIRIS PADA PERUSAHAAN MANUFAKTUR YANG TERDAFTAR
DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA PERIODE 2011-2014)
Latar Belakang :
Transfer
pricing menurut Gunadi (2013) merupakan harga atas transfer barang atau
jasa dengan nama dan dalam bentuk apapun antar perusahaan yang mempunyai
hubungan istimewa (associates) baik
dalam negeri maupun luar negeri. Akan tetapi pada kenyataanya transfer pricing sering digunakan untuk
memperkecil beban pajak yang harus dibayarkan oleh perusahaan. Transfer pricing presents tax opportunities
that can benefit an organization on many levels. Some suggest that transfer
pricing has become the most important tax issue in the world (Burke, 2011).
Kasus penyalahgunaan transfer pricing beberapa waktu yang
lalu menjadi pemberitaan, sepert kasus yang menimpa Google di Inggris,
Starbucks Inggris, Amazon Inggris, dan lain-lain. Starbucks Inggris misalnya,
pada tahun 2011 sama sekali tidak membayar pajak korporasi padahal berhasil
mencetak penjualan sebesar £398 juta. Selain itu mereka juga mengaku rugi sejak
tahun 2008, dengan jumlah kerugiannya mencapai £112 juta atau sekitar Rp1,7
triliun. Padahal dalam laporan kepada investornya di Amerika Serikat, Starbucks
mengatakan bahwa mereka memperoleh keuntungan yang besar di Inggris, bahkan
penjualannya selama 3 tahun (2008-2010) mencapai £1,2 miliar atau sekitar Rp18
triliun. Dengan kerugian ini, Starbucks Inggris tidak pernah membayar pajak
korporasi. Bahkan selama 14 tahun beroperasi di Inggris, Starbucks hanya
membayar pajak sebesar £8,6 juta. Selain itu, Google Inggris pada tahun 2011
juga berhasil mencatat pendapatan sebesar £398 juta tetapi hanya membayar pajak
sebesar £6 juta. Hal yang sama terjadi di Amazon Inggris, dimana mereka
berhasil melakukan penjualan di Inggris sebesar £3,35 miliar selama tahun 2011
tetapi hanya membayar pajak sebesar £1,5 juta. (Setiawan, 2014).
Sehubungan
dengan harga transfer tersebut, Dirjen pajak dalam rangka mengatur beberapa
kententuan mengenai transfer pricing yang
tercerimin di dalam Undang-undang Nomor 36 Tahun 2008 pasal 18 yang mengatur
mengenai pajak penghasilan juga membahas mengenai transfer pricing. Di dalam pasal tersebut dijelaskan bahwa transfer pricing mencakup beberapa hal
diantaranya hubungan istimewa dan wewenang untuk melakukan koreksi atas
transaksi yang tidak sesuai dengan prinsip kewajaran (Arm’s lenght principle). Dalam Undang-undang Nomor 36 Tahun 2008 di
dalam pasal 18(4) menjelaskan bahwa hubungan istimewa terjadi karna adanya
kepemilikan oleh wajib pajak atas penguasaan saham suatu badan oleh badan
lainnya sebanyak 25% (dua puluh lima persen) atau lebih. Transaksi-transaksi
yang terjadi antar pemilik hubungan istimewa inilah yang disebut transfer pricing.
Berdasarkan latar belakang
yang telah dijelaskan diatas, mengenai beberapa faktor yang mempengaruhi
terjadinya transfer pricing dalam
suatu perusahaan. Karna itulah peneliti
melakukan
penelitian dengan judul “PENGARUH
BEBAN PAJAK, TUNNELING INCENTIVE, DAN KARAKTER
EKSEKUTIF TERHADAP KEPUTUSAN TRANSFER PRICING PERUSAHAAN (STUDI EMPIRIS PADA
PERUSAHAAN MANUFAKTUR YANG
TERDAFTAR DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA PERIODE 2011-2014).”
Sampel yang digunakan dalam
penelitian ini berasal dari perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek
Indonesia, alasan pemilihan sampel tersebut dikarenakan sebagian besar
penanaman modal asing bergerak di bidang manufaktur dan mempunyai kaitan intern
perusahaan yang cukup substansial dengan induk perusahaan di luar negeri.
Tujuan :
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk melihat adanya pengaruh
variable pajak, tunneling incentive dan karakter eksekutif terhadap keputusan
transfer pricing.
Hipotesis
:
1.
H1 :
Beban pajak berpengaruh positif terhadap keputusan transfer pricing perusahaan
2.
H2 : Tunneling Incentive berpengaruh positif
terhadap transfer pricing
3.
H3 :
Karakter eksekutif risk taker
berpengaruh positif terhadap keputusan transfer
pricing perusahaan
Alat Analisis :
a. Statistik
Deskriptif.
b. Untuk
mengetahui pengaruh setiap variabel yaitu beban pajak, tunneling
incentive, karakter
eksekutif risk taker
terhadap keputusan transfer pricng dapat
digunakan metode analisis binary
logistic dengan
persamaan regresi sebagai berikut :
Y = α + β1 X1 + β2 X2 +
β3 X3+ β4 X4+ β5 X5+ e
Keterangan
Y = Transfer pricing
X1 = Beban pajak
X2 = Tunneling Incentive
X3 = Resiko perusahaan
(coorporate risk) i pada t
X4 = Total perusahaan i pada
tahun t
X5 = Perumbuhan penjualan
perusahaan i pada t
β1,β2,β3,β4,β5
`= Koefisien regresi
α = Nilai Y bila X =0
e = error
Objek Penelitian :
Sampel yang digunakan
dalam penelitian ini adalah perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia
periode 2011-2014.
Pembahasan :
1.
Analisis
statistik deskriptif
Analisis statistik deskriptif dalam penelitian ini
dilakukan untuk mencari mean, standard deviation, nilai maksimum, dan nilai
minimum dari variabel-variabel yang digunakan dalam penelitian, seperti yang
ditunjukkan dalam tabel berikut ini.
Tabel
Statistik
Deskriptif
|
|
N
|
Minimum
|
Maximum
|
Mean
|
Std.Deviation
|
|
ETR
|
124
|
-.3164
|
.4050
|
.207409
|
.0939592
|
|
Tunneling
|
124
|
.260
|
1.000
|
.64640
|
.207112
|
|
Risk
|
124
|
.095
|
1.561
|
.42144
|
.223231
|
|
Size
|
124
|
14.084
|
41.633
|
26.81593
|
4.398467
|
|
Sales
Growth
|
124
|
-.9056
|
1.2731
|
.149538
|
.2661431
|
|
Valid
N (Listwise)
|
124
|
|
|
|
|
Berdasarkan tabel hasil statistik deskriptif untuk
variable beban pajak menunjukan bahwa mean sebesar 0.207409 dan standar deviasi
sebesar 0.0939592. Nilai standar deviasi yang lebih kecil dibandingkan dengan
nilai rata-rata, menunjukan effective tax rate dari masing-masing perusahaan antar perusahaan
sampel memiliki perbedaan besaran yang hampir sama. Perusahaan dengan effective
tax rate yang terendah sebesar -0.316 yaitu PT Asianplast Industries Tbk dan
yang terbesar 0.405, PT Indo Kordsa Tbk
Tabel statistik deskriptif diatas nilai rata-rata
untuk variable tennuling incentive sebesar 0,64640 dan standar deviasi sebesar
0,207112. Nilai standar deviasi yang lebih besar dibandingkan dengan nilai
rata-rata menunjukan kepemilikan saham asing yang dimiliki oleh perusahaan
sampel memiliki perbedaan yang relatif kecil. Nilai minimum pada kepemilikan
asing sebesar 0.260 yang dimiliki oleh PT Asiaplast Industries Tbk.
Hasil statistik deskriptif untuk variable resiko pada
penelitian ini diukur menggunakan rumus akar kuadrat dari income before tax
ditambah accumulated depreciation dan amortization dibagi total aset. Resiko
perusahaan memiliki nilai rata-rata sebesar 0.42144 dan nilai standar deviasi
sebesar 0.223231 . Nilai standar deviasi resiko perusahaan yang lebih besar
dibandingakan dengan nilai rata-ratanya menunjukan bahwa resiko antara
perusahaan memiliki perbedaan yang relatif kecil antar masing-masing sampel
perusahaannya. Nilai terendah dari resiko perusahaan sebesar 0.095 dan
tertinggi sebesar 1.561, yaitu perusahaan PT Astra Auto Part Tbk
Variable size dalam penelitian ini di ukur dengan
logaritma natural total aset perusahaan. Rata-rata ukuran perusahaan adalah
sebesar 26.81593 dan standar deviasi sebesar4.398467. Nilai standar deviasi
yang lebihkecil, menunjukan bahwa ukuran perusahaan pada sampel penelitian ini
memiliki perbedaan yang hampir sama antar masing-masing sampel perusahaan.
Perusahaan yang memiliki ukuran perusahaan tertinggi sebesar 41.633 adalah
Nippon Indosari Corporindo Tbk
Variable sales growth dalam penelitian ini diukur
menggunakan tingkat penjualan tahun dikurang dengan penjualan tahun
sebelumnnya. Sales growth memiliki rata-rata sebesar 0.149538. Strandar deviasi
sales growth adalah sebesar 0.2661431. Nilai standar deviasi yang lebih besar
menunjukan bahwa pertumbuhan penjualan pada perusahaan sampel memiliki
perbedaan yang relatif kecil antar
masing-masing perusahaan. Perusahaan yang memiliki pertumbuhan paling tinggi
adalah PT Sumi Indo Kabel Tbk sebesar 1.273 PT Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk,
sedangkan perusahaan yang memiliki pertumbuhan penjualan terendah yaitu sebesar
-0,9056 adalah PT Citra Turbindo Tbk.
2. Uji
Hipotesis
Pengujian hipotesis ini digunakan untuk menunjukan
pengaruh variable-variable independen yaitu beban pajak, Tunneling Incentive,
dan karakter eksekutif risk taker terhadap keputusan transfer pricing
perusahaan. Pengujian hipotesis ini dilakukan
dengan menggunakan regresi
logistik untuk melihat pengaruh variable-variable independen terhadap variable
dependen, cukup dengan melihat Variable in the equation, pada kolom Significant
dibandingkan dengan tingkat alpha 0,05 (5%). Apabila tingkat signifikasi lebih kecil
dari 0,05, maka hipotesis (Ha) yang
diajukan dapat diterima. Berikut disajikan hasil Variables in the Equation
Tabel
4.11
Variable
in the Equation
|
|
B
|
Sig.
|
|
ETR
|
6.002
|
.025
|
|
Tunneling Incentive
|
2.960
|
.018
|
|
Risk
|
-.511
|
.619
|
|
Size
|
.042
|
.463
|
|
Sales Growth
|
-2.101
|
.018
|
|
Contant
|
-2.323
|
.204
|
a.
Uji
Hipotesis 1
Ha1: beban pajak berpengaruh terhadap keputusan
transfer pricing perusahaan. Berdasarkan
tabel 4.11 diatas diketahui variable beban pajak (X1) mempunyai koefisien beta
yang positif sebesar 6.002 terhadap keputusan transfer pricing dan nilai
ρ-value (sig.) sebesar 0.025 < 0.05, maka H1 diterima yang berarti pajak
berpengaruh positif terhadap keputusan transfer pricing perusahaan.
b.
Uji
Hipoteis 2
Ha2: Tunneling incentive berpengaruh terhadap
keputusan transfer pricing perusahaan. Berdasarkan tabel 4.11 diatas diketahui variable
tunneling incentive (X2) mempunyai koefisien beta yang positif sebesar 2.960
terhadap keputusan transfer pricing dan nilai ρ-value (sig.) sebesar 0.018 <
0.05, maka H2 diterima yang berarti tunneling incentive berpengaruh positif
terhadap keputusan transfer pricing perusahaan.
c.
Uji
Hipotesis 3
Ha3 : Karakter eksekutif risk taker berpengaruh
terhadap keputusan transfer pricing perusahaan. Berdasarkan
hasil pengujian yang disajikan pada tabel 4.11 diatas diketahui variable
karakter eksekutif risk taker(X3) mempunyaui koefisien beta yang negatif
sebesar -0.511 terhadap keputusan transfer pricing dan nilai ρ-value (sig.)
sebesar 0.619 > 0.05, maka H3 ditolak yang berarti karakter eksekutif risk
taker tidak berpengaruh terhadap keputusan transfer pricing.
3.
Variable
Kontrol ukuran perusahaan
Berdasarkan tabel 4.11 diatas dapat diketahui bahwa
variable kontrol ukuran perusahaan mempunyai koefisien beta positif sebesar
0.042 terhadap keputusan transfer pricing dan nilai signifikan sebesar 0.463
yaitu > 0,05, sehingga variable kontrol ukuran perusahaan tidak berpengaruh
positif terhadap keputusan transfer pricing perusahaan.
4.
Variable
Kontrol Sales Growth
Berdasarkan uji hipotesis yang dilakukan, dapat
dilihat pada tabel 4.11 diatas diketahui bahwa variable kontrol sales growth
mempunyai koefisien beta negative -2.101 terhadap keputusan transfer pricing dan nilai
signifikan sebesar 0.018 > 0.050, sehingga variable kontrol sales growth
perusahaan berpengaruh terbalik, hal dikarenakan beta yang hasilnya negative
Kesimpulan :
Berdasarkan hasil analisis data dan pembahasan yang
telah dilakukan, dapat disimpulkan sebagai berikut:
1.
Hipotisis
pertama (H1) yaitu, beban pajak berpengaruh positif terhadap keputusan transfer
pricing perusahaan. Hasil pengujian hipotesis yang dilakukan menunjukan nilai
ρ-value (sig.) sebesar 0.025 < 0,50, yang berarti H1 diterima, variable
pajak berpengaruh positif terhadap keputusan transfer pricing perusahaan. Hasil
penelitian ini sejalan dengan penelitian yang dilakukan oleh Yuniasin (2012),
pengaruh beban pajak terhadap keputusan transfer pricing didasarkan pada
besarnya beban pajak yang harus dibayar oleh perusahaan. Beban pajak yang
semakin besar memici perusahaan untuk melakukan transfer pricing dengan harapan
dapat menekan beban tersebut.
2.
Hipotesis
kedua (H2) pada penelitian ini adalah tunneling incentive berpengaruh terhadap
keputusan transfer pricing perusahaan. Nilai ρ-value (sig.) sebesar 0.018 yang
lebih kecil dari 0.050. Nilai sig yang lebih kecil menandakan bahwa H2
diterima, variable tunneling incentive berpengaruh positif terhadap keputusan
transfer pricing perusahaan. Hasil penelitian ini didukung oleh hasil
penelitian yang dilakukan oleh Yuniasih (2012), Transaksi pihak terkait lebih
umum digunakan untuk tujuan transfer kekayaan dari pada pembayaran dividen, hal
ini dikarenakan perusahaan yang terdaftar harus mendistribusikan dividend.
3.
Hipotesis
ketiga (H3) pada penelitian ini yaitu karakter eksekutif risk taker berpengaruh
positif terhadap keputusan transfer pricing. Dengan nilai (sig.) 0.619 yang
lebih besar dari 0.050. Hasil hipotesis ketiga ditolak, yang berarti karakter
eksekutif tidak berpengaruh positif terhadap keputusan transfer pricing pada
perusahaan. Hasil penelitian ini tidak sejalan dengan penelitian yang dilakukan
oleh Budimana(2012) hal ini bias jadi dikarenakan Dimana pada penelitian
sebelumnya sampel yang digunakan adalah perusahaan non banking, credit agencies
other than bank, securities, insurance dan investasi menurut klasifikasi ICMD.
Sedangkan pada penelitian ini sampel yang digunakan perusahaan manufaktur.
4.
Hasil
dari penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa variabel kontrol pertama, yaitu ukuran
perusahaan (size) tidak berpengaruh positif signifikan terhadap keputusan
transfer pricing dengan nilai ρ-value (sig.) sebesar 0.463
5.
Hasil
dari penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa variabel kontrol kedua yaitu, tingkat
pertumbuhan penjualan (sales growth) berpengaruh signifikan terhadap keputusan
transfer pricing dengan nilai ρ-value (sig.) sebesar 0.018. Dengan arah
terbalik hal ini dikarenakan beta yang dihasilkan -2.101.
Jurnal 4 :
TRANSFER PRICING POLICIES AND TAX MANIPULATIONS.
Introduction :
Transfer pricing is the
pricing of intra firm trade of Transactional Corporation. Intra firm trade is
defined here as transactions involving international shipments of commodities
(including capital, finished goods), technology and services between branches
or affiliates under the control of one firm. Transfer price is defined as the
price paid for goods transferred from one economic unit to another, assuming
that the two units involved are situated in different countries, but belong to
the same transnational firm.
The term “transfer
price” applies indiscriminately to all prices for the transfer of goods within
the same group of transnational companies. So when the parties establish a
price for the transaction, they are engaging in transfer pricing. This can be
either market based, that is equivalent to what is being charged in the outside
market for similar goods, or it can be nonmarket based (that is cost based and
negotiated based).
It is a mechanism for
distributing revenue between different divisions which jointly develop,
manufacture and market products and services. Transfer prices among components
of an enterprise may be used to reflect allocation of resources among such
components, or for other purposes. Transfer prices are significant for both
taxpayers and tax administrations because they determine in large part the
income and expenses, and therefore taxable profits, of associated enterprises
in different tax jurisdictions. Transfer pricing exists to communicate data
which will lead to goalachieving decisions and also to evaluate performance and
motivate managers to make goal-achieving decisions.
Purpose
:
This study aims at summarizing the OECD guidelines
applicable to the concept of transfer pricing and to review various situations
where by big corporate houses have been penalized by the government for doing
the transfer pricing manipulation and their impact upon the performance of
those companies.
Analysis Tools :
The methods to compute
the arm’s length price are-
a.
Comparable uncontrolled
price method
b.
Resale price
method
c.
Cost-plus method
d.
Profit- split
method
e.
Transactional
net margin method (TNMM)
f.
Any other basis
approved by the central govt. which has the effect of value such transaction at
arm’s length price.
Object
of Research :
This study basically focuses upon the practical
applicability of various transfer pricing manipulations and their consequential
impact upon the performance of various strategic business units.
1. To
analyze the tax manipulations done through transfer pricing by various
2. corporate
houses.
3. To
review the manipulations in transfer pricing through court cases
Discussion :
The organization for
economic corporation and development (OECD), released the final version of its
transfer pricing guidelines. The OECD is a unique forum where the governments
of 30 democracies work together to address the economic, social and environmental
challenges of globalization. A separate code on transfer pricing under Sections
92 to 92F of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 (the act) covers intra group cross
border transactions and is applicable from 1 April 2001. Transfer pricing
methods, impose extensive annual transfer pricing documentation requirements,
and contain harsh penal provisions for noncompliance. The various requirements,
disclosure, documents required and penalties imposed under the transfer pricing
guidelines.
1.
Vodafone
About
the Company: Vodafone Group Plc. is
a British multinational telecommunications company headquartered in London and
with its registered office in Newbury, Berkshire. It is the world’s
second-largest mobile telecommunications company measured by both subscribers
and 2011 revenues and had 439 million subscribers as of December 2011. Vodafone
owns and operates networks in over 30 countries and has partner networks in
over 40 additional countries. Its Vodafone Global Enterprise division provides
telecommunications and IT services to corporate clients in over 65 countries.
Vodafone also owns 45% of Verizon Wireless, the largest mobile telecommunications
company in the United States measured by subscribers.
India formerly
Vodafone Essar and Hutchison Essar, is the third largest mobile
network operator in India after Airtel and Reliance Communications by
subscriber base. It is based in Mumbai, Maharashtra. It has approximately
147.48 million customers as of December 2012.
Vodafone to challenge tax department in transfer
pricing case Facts and contentions: In 1992, the Hong Kong based, Hutchison
Group acquired interest in an Indian telecom business through a joint venture
(JV) company. Hutchison Telecommunications International (Cayman) Holdings Ltd.
(HTIL) held shares of CGP Investments (Holdings) Ltd. (CGP Investments), a
holding company, based in Cayman Island. Through CGP investment and the various
Mauritius entities, HTIL held 67% in the Hutch Essar Ltd. (HEL) an Indian JV
company. Thus through CGP investments, the hutch group held, directly and
indirectly controlling interest in HEL.
In December 2006, HTIL issued a press statement,
regarding a possible sale of its equity interests in HEL, which was carrying on
telecom operations in India. Vodafone NL, a Dutch entity, made a bid to acquire
share capital of CGP Investments and consequently, in February 2007, entered
into an agreement for acquisition of the Indian interests of HTIL. Prior to
this, Vodafone had entered into a joint venture with Bharti Airtel (Airtel), an
Indian company, which was also engaged in providing similar services as that of
HEL. Subsequently, an agreement for Sale and Purchase of Share and Loans (SPA)
was entered into between HTIL and Vodafone NL under which HTIL agreed to procure
and transfer the entire issued share capital of CGP Investments, held by a
group company. After the transfer of all rights HTIL announced that Vodafone NL
had acquired the controlling interest in HEL. Vodafone NL informed Essar Group
(the other stakeholder in HEL) about the acquisition of the entire holding from
HTIL. Thereafter, Vodafone NL also applied to the Foreign Investment Promotion
Board (FIPB) (Indian foreign investment regulatory authority) and sought
approval for direct acquisition of 67% in HEL. Vodafone NL made the payment of
consideration to HTIL for acquiring the entire share capital of CGP
Investments, as per the
instructions of the Hutch Group.
In connection with the transaction, the Tax
Authority issued a notice to Vodafone NL enquiring as to why Vodafone NL should
not be treated as a, taxpayer-in-default for not withholding taxes on its
payments to HTIL. Subsequently, Vodafone NL filed a writ petition before the
High court, challenging the validity of the notice.
a.
Ruling: The High court, while dismissing the petition filed,
held that the said transaction would be subject to the scrutiny of the Tax
Authority for the reason that the dominant purpose of the transaction was to
acquire the controlling interest in HEL Further, as the High court was not in
possession of the relevant agreements, it was unable to decide the true nature
of the transaction and concluded that it was not in a position to deliberate on
the taxability of the transaction, including the jurisdictional issue. Pursuant
to the order of the High court, Vodafone NL filed a special leave petition
(SLP) before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, dismissed the SLP and
held that the jurisdictional issue would have to be examined by the Tax
Authority as a preliminary issue pursuant to the Supreme Court observation, the
Tax Authority asserted that it had jurisdiction to tax the transaction and
considering the fact that Vodafone NL had failed to withhold tax under the
provisions of the ITL, it was treated as a „taxpayer default. Aggrieved,
Vodafone NL challenged this order before the High court by way of a writ
petition. While dismissing the petition, the High court held that the Tax
Authority had jurisdiction to tax the transaction aggrieved, Vodafone NL
approached the Supreme Court on the issue of taxability of the transaction. The
Supreme Court reviewed the case once again and the proceedings took place over
a period of 28 days during the months from August to October 2011.
b.
Decision: The Supreme Court, held that the indirect transfer,
would not be taxable, according to the Indian tax laws. The sites of the
capital asset, being shares, would be situated where the company is
incorporated and where the register of members is maintained. The withholding
tax provisions under the ITL will not apply when there is anoff shore
transaction between two non-residents. Accordingly, such provisions would not
have an extra territorial operation. Further, the SC accepted that tax planning
within the framework of law is permissible,unless the planning is a sham or a
colourable device. In any event, the onus is on the Tax Authority to establish
that a transaction is a sham. The source rule provisions under the ITL needs to
be strictly construed and, accordingly, in the absence of a look through
provision, an indirect transfer would not be taxable in India.
c.
Conclusion/
interpretation: The case
highlighted that if the controlling foreign enterprise makes an indirect
transfer through abuse of organization form without any reasonable business
purpose resulting in tax avoidance or avoidance of withholding tax, then the
Tax Authority may disregard the form of arrangement, re characterize the equity
transfer according to economic substance, and impose tax on the foreign
enterprise. The burden is on the Tax Authority to allege and establish abuse,
where there is a tax but in this case after applying various tests by Supreme
Court it was concluded that sale of CGP investments shares was a genuine
business transaction and not a fraudulent method to avoid capital gain tax.
2.
LG Electronics
India Pvt. Ltd
About
the Company: LG Electronics is a
South Korean multinational electronics company headquartered in Yeouido-dong,
Seoul, and a member of the LG Group Chaebol. The company operates its business
through five divisions: Mobile Communications, Home Entertainment, Home
Appliances, Air Conditioning, and Energy Solutions. It is the world’s
second-largest television manufacturer and the
world’s
fifth-largest mobile phone maker by unit sales in the second quarter of 2012.
a.
Facts and
contentions: LG electronics Inc.
(LGK or associated enterprise or AE) is a Korean company engaged in the
manufacture, sale and distribution of electronic products and electrical
appliances. LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd (LGI or tax payer) is a wholly-owned
subsidiary in India. LGI, in the capacity of the license obtained from LGK that
is licensor, a right to use the technical know- how for manufacture, marketing,
sale and services of its products, for which a royalty of 1% was agreed. The
licensor allowed the license for no charge to use its brand names and
trademarks for products manufactures in India.
b.
Ruling: During the course of transfer pricing assessment
proceedings, the transfer pricing officer observed that advertisement,
marketing and promotion expenses (AMP) were 3.85% of the tax payers’ sales. The
transfer pricing officer (TPO) computed the similar percentage in the case of
Videocon appliances Ltd (0.12%) and whirl pool India ltd (2.66%) with their
arithmetic mean at 1.39%. the difference was considered by the transfer pricing
officer to be excess AMP incurred by the tax payer on the brand promotion for
the A, which should have been compensated by the associated enterprise (AE) to
the tax payer. The TPO thus made the adjustment for the difference. The tax
payer appealed for the tribunal. A special bench of tribunal was constituted to
adjudicate the issue.
b.
Decision: The special bench held that decision gets diluted or
vacated in the view of the retrospective amendment made by the finance act-
that validated the jurisdiction of TPO in examining a transaction even though
not expressly referred to him by assessing officer (AO). The special bench also
held that an agreement between associated enterprise can be formal or in
writing or informal or oral. The critical test would be the conduct of parties
to transaction. If the taxpayer has advertised the brand of AE then it can be
inferred that there is understanding between the tax payer and AE to its
effect. Moreover in this case the AMP expenses incurred were higher so special
bench accordingly held that a transaction incurred expenses for the promotion
of the brand .of the associated enterprise so the reimbursement by the brand
owner is required.
3.
Coca-Cola
Company
About
the Company: The Coca-Cola Company
is an American multinational beverage corporation and manufacturer, retailer
and marketer of non-alcoholic beverage concentrates and syrups, which is
headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia. The Company is best known for its flagship
product Coca-Cola, invented in 1886 by pharmacist John Stith Pemberton in
Columbus, Georgia.
Coca-Cola currently offers more than 500 brands in
over 200 countries or territories and serves over 17 billion servings each day.
The company operates a franchised distribution system dating from 1889 where
The Coca-Cola Company only produces syrup concentrate which is then sold to
various bottlers throughout
the world who
hold an exclusive territory.
a.
High Court Rules
against Coca-Cola in Transfer Pricing Case Facts and contentions: Coca cola the soft drink company had an agreement to
offer advisory services to Britco at the rate of cost plus 5%. According
to Coca-Cola’s the transfer pricing rules cannot be applied in the
absence of prima facie evidence of profit transfer outside India. They
were meant to check profit erosion outside India and therefore could not
be applied in cases where there is no prima facie evidence of profit transfer
outside the country.
b.
Ruling/
decision: The Punjab &
Haryana High Court ruled against Coca-Cola India’s contention that the proof of
profit transfer outside India is a precondition for applying transfer pricing
rules. Coca-Cola approached the high court after it was served a notice on
transfer pricing.
According to Coca-Cola, the transfer pricing
provisions have been incorporated in the Income-tax Act by the Finance Act 2001
and the applicability of these provisions has been limited to situations
involving profit diversion outside India. There is no material evidence to show
that profits have been diverted outside India.
4.
Sony Corporation
About
the Company: Sony Corporation
commonly referred to as Sony is Japanese multinational conglomerate
headquartered in Konan Minato in Tokyo, Japan. Its diversified business is
primarily focused on the electronics, game, entertainment and financial
services sectors.] The company is one of the leading manufacturers of
electronic products for the consumer and professional markets. Sony is ranked
87th on the 2012 list of Fortune Global 500.
a.
Facts and
Contentions: The Indian Transfer
Pricing Regulations require Sony India to conduct all transactions with its AEs
at an Arm’s Length Price (“ALP”). Sony India claimed that all its
international transactions were undertaken at ALP and for this purpose relied
upon Transactional Net Margin Method (“TNMM”). For the purpose of
calculating the ALP, Sony India had chosen the foreign Aes from whom the
components were imported as tested parties and computed the profits of AEs with
Indian comparable chosen from Indian data base. The same method was chosen for
the distribution activities relating to high-end electronic products, projector
tapes etc. where Sony India was taken as the tested party.
b.
Rulings: However, the Transfer Pricing Officer (“TPO”)
did not agree that foreign AEs could be taken as tested parties for determining
the ALP and accordingly asked Sony India to submit fresh transfer pricing
report taking Sony India as a tested party and Indian entities as comparable.
The TPO made certain transfer pricing adjustments to the income of Sony India
which were adopted by the Assessing Officer.
c.
Decision: The Tribunal heard the parties at length and
thereafter pronounced a detailed order dealing with the various issues at hand.
The Tribunal made references to the International jurisprudence with respect to
transfer pricing where the Indian law and jurisprudence is lacking. The
decision of the tribunal are-
Conclusion
:
As importance of the
transfer pricing is increasing, it is generally considered as a major
international taxation issue faced by MNCs today. The tools is particular
attractive because it is largely invisible to the public and is difficult and
expensive for regulatory authority to detect. Transfer pricing is important to
corporations because its affect calculation of divisional, segmental, product
and global profits. The reported price matter to stock markets because they
effect earning, dividend, share price and return on capital. They matter to co.
executive because there financial rewards are frequently linked to corporate
earnings. Transfer pricing matter to the state because they affect the taxes
that it can levy upon corporate profit to finance public goal to secure its
legitimacy.
Transfer pricing, like
science and technology, is a neutral phenomenon. It is its use or abuse which
makes it an innocuous commercial practice or a cognizable offence. Transfer
pricing is not an immoral or illegal act. It can be purely for business
considerations without any intentional or unintentional endeavor to defraud
government or any concerned party. Therefore transfer pricing is generally
conceived as a permissible practice like other administrative or commercial
practices of business entities. So transfer pricing should be treated as normal
routine practice and not a tool to evade tax.
Jurnal 5 :
CONFLICTING TRANSFER PRICING INCENTIVES AND THE ROLE OF COORDINATION
Introduciton
:
“Transfer pricing is both a corporate tax and a
customs valuation issue” (KPMG 2007) because transfer prices set on trade that
occurs within a multinational corporation (MNC), or intrafirm trade,
simultaneously affect MNCs’ income tax and customs duty obligations. As a
result, firms that cannot minimize both income taxes and customs duties with a
single transfer price face a complicated optimization problem.1 We begin by
documenting that this challenge results in MNCs’ transfer prices being less
sensitive to income tax rates while being more sensitive to customs duties. We
then develop and test hypotheses surrounding how coordination within the
government (i.e., enforcement) and within the firm (i.e., communication) can
further influence firms’ pricing policies. Our study is novel in that we document,
in a specific setting, how coordination influences MNCs’ tax reporting behavior
with important implications for MNCs’ aggregate tax burdens.
Evidence suggesting that the allocation of profits
among affiliated entities within an MNC is sensitive to income tax rates can be
found in the accounting, finance, and economics literatures (see Hines 1997 and
U.S. Treasury 2007 for a review). Empirical work documents that transfer prices
also appear to be sensitive to tariff rates (Swenson, 2002; Clausing, 2003;
Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006). Though several analytic models in the
economics literature outline the joint role of customs duties and income
taxes on transfer prices for intrafirm trade (see Horst 1971 and Samuelson
1982), none of this empirical work investigates transfer prices in the presence
of both income taxes and customs duties.
We undertake an empirical analysis of transfer
pricing behavior that considers that MNCs do not seek to minimize income tax
payments or duty payments but instead seek to minimize the sum of income tax
and duty payments. Due to the difficulty of the optimization problem created by
the joint (and sometimes conflicted) influences of duty and income tax
minimization, we expect that coordination is an important factor in this
setting. Thus, we further study the effect of coordination in the context of
international trade in goods.
Although the interaction between prices set on
related party transactions for income tax and customs purposes has gained
little academic attention of late, it was the subject of two recent
conferences. Held in 2006 and 2007, and jointly organized by the World Customs
Organization(WCO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), these conferences drew customs and tax authorities from around the
world, as well as members of the international trade community. Interest in the
joint role that transfer prices play in income tax and duty minimization is
increasing due to the growing importance of cross-border intrafirm trade, governments’
need to enhance and preserve their tax revenues, and firms’ desire for more
certainty regarding their tax positions (Ping and Silberzstein 2008).
Purpose :
Our study evaluates the role of coordination, at
both the government- and the firmlevel, on the transfer prices set by U.S.
multinational corporations (MNCs) when income taxes and duties cannot be
jointly minimized with a single transfer price.
Hypothesis Development
:
1. Governmental
Coordination à
H1: MNCs facing conflicting income tax and customs duty transfer pricing
incentives exhibit less income-tax-motivated transfer pricing when governmental
enforcement of transfer prices for income tax and customs duty purposes is more
likely to be coordinated.
2. Corporate
Coordination à
H2: MNCs facing conflicting income tax and customs duty transfer pricing
incentives exhibit less income-tax-motivated transfer pricing when corporate
transfer pricing decisions for income tax and customs duty purposes are more
likely to be coordinated.
Analysis Tools :
1. Income
Tax Transfer Pricing.
2. Customs
Duty Transfer Pricing.
3. Conflicting
Incentives Between Income Tax and Customs Duty Transfer Pricing.
Object of Research : multinational corporation (MNC).
Discussion :
Role
of Coordination on Conflicting Transfer Pricing Incentives :
1. EMPIRICAL
SPECIFICATION
Our hypotheses predict that MNCs facing
conflicting transfer pricing incentives will focus less on income tax
minimization when there is relatively greater coordination in governments’ or firms’
income tax and customs functions. Equation (3) introduces Coordination into
Equation (2), and tests for an interaction effect on Conflict × ITPI (i.e.,
a three-way interaction).
log PTI =
β0 + β1ITPI + β2 Conflict + β3 Conflict×ITPI + β4 Coordination
+ β5 ITPI×Coordination + β6 Conflict×Coordination + β7 Conflict×ITPI×Coordination
+ β8logAssets + β9logComp + β10logGDP + Industry, Year
Indicators
Where,
Coordination = 1
if the affiliate faces a coordinated governmental authority (One_Authority and
One_Audit) or if the affiliate is more likely to be coordinated with its
US parent (Centralized, Expat, Private, TradeDum, and SizeDum),
0 otherwise.
All other variables are
as defined above for Equations (1) and (2).
Results
reported in Table 3 suggest that firms decrease the use of transfer prices that
focus on income tax minimization in the presence of conflicting incentives.
This initial evidence assumes that all MNCs have similar levels of internal
coordination and face equal enforcement. However, we expect that MNCs with
conflicting incentives are more likely to report consistent transfer prices
when they face coordinated income tax and customs enforcement. H1 then predicts
that in the presence of conflicting incentives this coordination could further
decrease the use of transfer prices that focus on income tax minimization.
Thus, we estimate Equation (3) using measures of governmental coordination; a
positive coefficient on β7 is consistent with H1.
We
next consider a separate channel through which coordination may influence
transfer prices. Here, we relax the assumption that all MNCs have similarly
coordinated income tax and customs functions and argue that relatively more
coordination is associated with a greater likelihood that MNCs minimize the aggregate
tax burden (i.e., the sum of income taxes and duties). H2 then predicts that in
the presence of conflicting incentives this coordination could further decrease
transfer pricing’s link to income tax minimization. Thus, a positive
coefficient on β7 when using proxies for corporate coordination to capture Coordination
in Equation (3) is consistent with H2.
2. H1
– RESULT
Table 4 reports results
from estimating Equation (3) using our measures of Gov’t- Coordination in
turn. In Column (1), which uses One_Authority, we expect and find a
positive coefficient on the three-way interaction term (β7=0.810; p<.0001).
This result suggests that affiliates facing conflicting transfer pricing
incentives further decrease (increase) their income tax (customs duty) transfer
pricing behavior in the presence of governmental integration of income tax and
customs enforcement.
Column
(2) presents results using One_Audit as our measure of Coordination.
Again, we find a positive coefficient on β7.29 The interpretation of One_Audit
is the same as the interpretation of One_Authority. Thus, both
formal and informal integration appear to matter for the transfer pricing
decisions of affiliatess facing conflicting transfer pricing incentives. Joint
minimization of duties and income taxes is arguably more difficult for affiliates
facing conflicting transfer pricing incentives that also face integrated
customs and income tax enforcement. Results presented in Table 4 support H1 and
suggest that in the presence of government coordination, affiliates with
conflicting incentives increase their use of consistent transfer prices for
income taxes and customs duties resulting in transfer prices that appear
consistent with duty minimization.
3. H2
– RESULT
Table
5 reports results from estimating Equation (3) using our proxies for corporate coordination.
Column (1) reports results using Centralized as our measure of corporate
coordination. We expect and find a positive coefficient on the three-way
interaction term (β7=0.548; p<.0001). Columns (2) through (5) show a similar
pattern using our other measures corporate coordination. Thus, results
presented in Table 5 provide support for H2. That is, coordination of income
tax and duty function within the MNC generally serves to raise awareness of a
transfer pricing conflict. The observation that firms respond to that awareness
by decreasing (increasing) income-tax (customs duty) motivated transfer pricing
behavior suggests that coordination prevents MNCs from myopically establishing
transfer prices that fixate on income tax minimization.
Conclusion :
The interaction between duty incentives and income
tax incentives in setting transfer prices on intrafirm trade has largely been
ignored in the academic transfer-pricing literature. Using affiliate-level
data, we demonstrate that conflicting transfer pricing incentives (i.e., when a
single price will not jointly minimize customs duties and income taxes) alter
traditional income-taxmotivated transfer pricing behavior. Our results suggest
that the average foreign affiliate of a U.S. MNC in our sample that faces a
significant transfer pricing conflict sets transfer prices to minimize duty
payments rather than income taxes.
We build on this baseline result to examine whether
governmental tax enforcement
coordination
and/or corporate tax planning coordination affect the transfer pricing behavior
of firms that face conflicting incentives. We first test whether the effect of
the conflict on income-tax-motivated transfer pricing is stronger for firms
that face integrated administration or integrated enforcement of duty and
income tax payments. In practice, if firms cannot report inconsistent transfer
prices on intrafirm trade for customs and income taxes, then duty minimization
should become a greater consideration in transfer pricing decisions for
conflict firms. Results are consistent with this expectation: firms facing a
significant transfer pricing conflict appear even less likely to engage in
income-tax-motivated income shifting behavior in jurisdictions where the income
tax and customs administrations are coordinated.
We also examine whether the effect of the transfer
pricing conflict is stronger for firms that are more likely to coordinate their
tax minimization efforts. Duty minimization should become a greater
consideration in transfer pricing decisions when firms are more likely to be
aware of conflicting duty payments in setting transfer prices for income tax
purposes. Consistent with this expectation, we do not observe
income-tax-motivated income shifting in firms facing a significant transfer
pricing conflict when the U.S. operation has relatively greater information about
and authority over foreign affiliates. These findings are novel because they
link the organizational structure of the firm to its tax planning decisions. We
also find that firms facing conflicting incentives that are also private,
engaged in more extensive amounts of international trade, or smaller appear to
focus more (less) on income tax (duty) minimization.
Finally, we investigate whether U.S. MNCs’ aggregate
tax burdens are affected by the change in transfer pricing behavior we
document. We find evidence that U.S. MNCs with a greater percentage of
affiliates facing governmental coordination report greater tax burdens. Additionally,
we find that U.S. MNCs with a higher percentage of affiliates coordinated with
the U.S. parent report significantly lower tax burdens. Thus, the transfer
pricing behavior we document at the affiliate-level appears to significantly
impact the total tax burden of the firm.
In summary, we find that when the expected duty
payment associated with shifting one dollar of income is considerable relative
to the expected income tax savings, firms appear to forgo some income tax
savings in favor of duty savings. When the firm faces government coordination, it
forgoes additional income tax savings. However, when the firm itself is
coordinated in settings its transfer prices, it recoups some income tax savings.
Thus, our study suggests that coordination plays a considerable role in the
transfer pricing behavior of multinational firms.
As with all empirical observational studies, there
are several caveats regarding our results. First, due to data limitations, our
analysis focuses only on trade between foreign affiliates and their U.S.
parents. However, we believe that our results should generalize to trade
between a MNC’s foreign affiliates. Second, we can only observe aggregate duty
burdens at the countryyear level. Because we are unable to observe the specific
products being bought and/or sold between the affiliate and its U.S. parent, we
rely on the World Bank’s data, which represents the normal basket of goods
traded in a specific country in a specific year. Finally, like almost all prior
transfer pricing research, we are unable to directly observe actual transfer
prices. As we only observe the link between affiliate profitability and tax
rates, we do know with certainty the precise mechanism(s) through which MNCs
respond to transfer pricing incentives.
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